It has suddenly dawned on the French that they can no longer dominate the EU – hence their opposition to its Constitution. However, their real problem is more fundamental than that.
May 24, 2005 (Press Release) --
It has suddenly dawned on the French that they can no longer dominate the EU – hence their opposition to its Constitution. However, their real problem is more fundamental than that. It is the highly frivolous expectation that the rest of the world must stand still in order to preserve their manufacturing and farming jobs. They and their European partners are in for a nasty surprise.
French society has always been in love with itself – creating barriers against what it considers the invasion of its culture, contamination of its language and the preservation of its social model. History is at work here, and it has played a critical role in shaping the agenda of other EU nations.
The emergence of a powerful Germany in the latter half of the 19th century troubled France. War ensued; Germany won, annexed Alsace Lorraine, and made the French pay reparations. This effectively ended France’s role as the dominant power in continental Europe. Then along came WW I and the two sides again attempted to resolve their differences by force. This time France was on the winning side; it regained Alsace Lorraine, and the Germans paid reparations. Not content with the outcome of Round 2, Germany went for broke in Round 3 – otherwise known as World War II, but that didn’t work out too well.
Immediately after the war, France tried a slightly different approach – granting itself a long-term lease on the coal and iron resources of Germany’s Saar region. This was however rebuffed – peacefully this time. The French then came up with the idea of supranational institutions where natural resources could be ‘pooled’. Unsurprisingly, the first such institution was the European Coal and Steel Community or ECSC. This was later followed by the European Economic Community or EEC. Through the EEC, the French secured guarantees in social policy as well as payments for their agricultural output, now known as the Common Agricultural Policy or CAP, all in exchange for free trade in Germany’s manufactured goods.
Thus the driving force behind the European project was the desire for the French to control their historically more powerful neighbor, effectively accommodated by a German need for international rehabilitation in the post-war world. This relationship worked as long as Germany continued to act as the diplomatic pigmy while the French maintained that they always operated in Europe’s best interest – which they leveraged onto the global stage.
The Benelux countries whose economies were closely tied to that of their much larger neighbors, Germany and France, had no option other than to join the EEC. Italy, playing a me-too role, also joined, a feat the Italians later repeated when they executed all manner of financial machinations to meet the initial requirements for joining the Euro.
As such, apart from the avoidance of war, which was never really on the cards, the six countries that initially joined what was to become the EU did so for a variety of different reasons, including practical necessity. Subsequently, prospective members, the smaller and/or poorer countries of Europe, had to conform if they wanted in. So they joined, but in a manner that was consistent with their own national goals and objectives. These included gaining access to the single market or assisting their transition to democracy – enter Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland.
This was never a club of independent minded nations with common goals.
France’s premier position in Europe remained secure for some time – greatly influencing continental social models in respect of their approach to taxation, working practices and social labor costs.
Then Britain finally decided to join the European Community and things began to change. At first, it’s application was vetoed by French President Charles de Gaulle – he immediately recognized the potential for destabilizing the delicate balance of power that had been so carefully constructed. Although Britain eventually joined when de Gaulle departed the scene, the Community continued to operate on a Franco-German axis.
However, as more independent-minded nations came on board, including those from Eastern Europe, French power greatly diminished. Nothing symbolizes this more than the fact that English has superceded French as the working language in Brussels.
The British were always more enthusiastic about EU enlargement and the politics of change has worked in their favor. For the French, the idea of Polish plumbers and architects displacing their own has turned them against the EU and its Constitution. Their dismay is neatly summarized in this extract from the Economist:
From a tender age, French voters are taught the virtues of Europe. For political leaders, on left and right alike, Europe has been the means of preserving and projecting French power in a world that was otherwise eroding it. In short, Europe offered comfort: protection from decline; reaffirmation of their social model; the foundation of peace.
This sense of comfort is now falling away.
All of this is compounded by economic problems – double-digit unemployment and deficits in the public finances.
Unlike the French, the Germans are not granting their voters a Referendum on the EU Constitution. The German social model was driven by a national post-war consensus as well as by European policy. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s attempts at reforming the economy in order to make it more flexible have failed – the country now has over 5 million unemployed, the unions remain powerful and people still want social security guarantees.
The single currency was expected to boost European economies and spur growth but things have not exactly turned out that way.
In the interim, the rest of the world has been moving on. There was a time, when most manufactured products emanated from either Western Europe or North America. Now other countries have caught up. It is strange that many in Western Europe believe that this is unfair, and that their jobs should remain permanently protected from injustices such as other nations providing better quality goods at a lower price.
The notion that the rest of the world must pay due deference to a European need to preserve jobs is both ludicrous and impractical. In time, an increasing number of countries will improve their competitive capabilities. This will further exacerbate the problems faced by Germany, France and other countries seeking to preserve what they call the European social model.
European politicians have only two ways out of corner in which they have painted themselves, one infinitely more unpalatable than the other.
The first is to be honest with their people by telling them that the only way forward is to greatly accelerate training and development in new industries and technologies, while accepting progressive and incremental restructuring of their labor markets. This will not be easy and politicians are notoriously short-termist. Yet, it is the more attractive of the two propositions.
The second and more distressing option is the British approach – wait for a crisis. Britain’s economic decline became so acute, that in the late 1970s the country had to borrow money from the IMF. The economic crisis resulted in ruthless and unpleasant action. Under the guise of Thatcherism, large swathes of the country’s manufacturing base were abandoned. The social upheaval this caused, and the fact that the government of the day was less than sympathetic to the plight of those affected, caused great difficulty.
Yet today, even taking into account the Blair government’s growth in the public sector, Britain has a much better rate of employment and sounder public finances than its European counterparts.
As with all journeys the first step is perhaps the hardest. It involves an acceptance of the fact that the rest of the world is moving without a care or concern for German manufacturing or French farming – they are too busy with their own concerns.
Who can blame them?
Jonathan Ledwidge is the author of the book A Mannequin for President - www.amannequinforpresident.com
French society has always been in love with itself – creating barriers against what it considers the invasion of its culture, contamination of its language and the preservation of its social model. History is at work here, and it has played a critical role in shaping the agenda of other EU nations.
The emergence of a powerful Germany in the latter half of the 19th century troubled France. War ensued; Germany won, annexed Alsace Lorraine, and made the French pay reparations. This effectively ended France’s role as the dominant power in continental Europe. Then along came WW I and the two sides again attempted to resolve their differences by force. This time France was on the winning side; it regained Alsace Lorraine, and the Germans paid reparations. Not content with the outcome of Round 2, Germany went for broke in Round 3 – otherwise known as World War II, but that didn’t work out too well.
Immediately after the war, France tried a slightly different approach – granting itself a long-term lease on the coal and iron resources of Germany’s Saar region. This was however rebuffed – peacefully this time. The French then came up with the idea of supranational institutions where natural resources could be ‘pooled’. Unsurprisingly, the first such institution was the European Coal and Steel Community or ECSC. This was later followed by the European Economic Community or EEC. Through the EEC, the French secured guarantees in social policy as well as payments for their agricultural output, now known as the Common Agricultural Policy or CAP, all in exchange for free trade in Germany’s manufactured goods.
Thus the driving force behind the European project was the desire for the French to control their historically more powerful neighbor, effectively accommodated by a German need for international rehabilitation in the post-war world. This relationship worked as long as Germany continued to act as the diplomatic pigmy while the French maintained that they always operated in Europe’s best interest – which they leveraged onto the global stage.
The Benelux countries whose economies were closely tied to that of their much larger neighbors, Germany and France, had no option other than to join the EEC. Italy, playing a me-too role, also joined, a feat the Italians later repeated when they executed all manner of financial machinations to meet the initial requirements for joining the Euro.
As such, apart from the avoidance of war, which was never really on the cards, the six countries that initially joined what was to become the EU did so for a variety of different reasons, including practical necessity. Subsequently, prospective members, the smaller and/or poorer countries of Europe, had to conform if they wanted in. So they joined, but in a manner that was consistent with their own national goals and objectives. These included gaining access to the single market or assisting their transition to democracy – enter Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland.
This was never a club of independent minded nations with common goals.
France’s premier position in Europe remained secure for some time – greatly influencing continental social models in respect of their approach to taxation, working practices and social labor costs.
Then Britain finally decided to join the European Community and things began to change. At first, it’s application was vetoed by French President Charles de Gaulle – he immediately recognized the potential for destabilizing the delicate balance of power that had been so carefully constructed. Although Britain eventually joined when de Gaulle departed the scene, the Community continued to operate on a Franco-German axis.
However, as more independent-minded nations came on board, including those from Eastern Europe, French power greatly diminished. Nothing symbolizes this more than the fact that English has superceded French as the working language in Brussels.
The British were always more enthusiastic about EU enlargement and the politics of change has worked in their favor. For the French, the idea of Polish plumbers and architects displacing their own has turned them against the EU and its Constitution. Their dismay is neatly summarized in this extract from the Economist:
From a tender age, French voters are taught the virtues of Europe. For political leaders, on left and right alike, Europe has been the means of preserving and projecting French power in a world that was otherwise eroding it. In short, Europe offered comfort: protection from decline; reaffirmation of their social model; the foundation of peace.
This sense of comfort is now falling away.
All of this is compounded by economic problems – double-digit unemployment and deficits in the public finances.
Unlike the French, the Germans are not granting their voters a Referendum on the EU Constitution. The German social model was driven by a national post-war consensus as well as by European policy. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s attempts at reforming the economy in order to make it more flexible have failed – the country now has over 5 million unemployed, the unions remain powerful and people still want social security guarantees.
The single currency was expected to boost European economies and spur growth but things have not exactly turned out that way.
In the interim, the rest of the world has been moving on. There was a time, when most manufactured products emanated from either Western Europe or North America. Now other countries have caught up. It is strange that many in Western Europe believe that this is unfair, and that their jobs should remain permanently protected from injustices such as other nations providing better quality goods at a lower price.
The notion that the rest of the world must pay due deference to a European need to preserve jobs is both ludicrous and impractical. In time, an increasing number of countries will improve their competitive capabilities. This will further exacerbate the problems faced by Germany, France and other countries seeking to preserve what they call the European social model.
European politicians have only two ways out of corner in which they have painted themselves, one infinitely more unpalatable than the other.
The first is to be honest with their people by telling them that the only way forward is to greatly accelerate training and development in new industries and technologies, while accepting progressive and incremental restructuring of their labor markets. This will not be easy and politicians are notoriously short-termist. Yet, it is the more attractive of the two propositions.
The second and more distressing option is the British approach – wait for a crisis. Britain’s economic decline became so acute, that in the late 1970s the country had to borrow money from the IMF. The economic crisis resulted in ruthless and unpleasant action. Under the guise of Thatcherism, large swathes of the country’s manufacturing base were abandoned. The social upheaval this caused, and the fact that the government of the day was less than sympathetic to the plight of those affected, caused great difficulty.
Yet today, even taking into account the Blair government’s growth in the public sector, Britain has a much better rate of employment and sounder public finances than its European counterparts.
As with all journeys the first step is perhaps the hardest. It involves an acceptance of the fact that the rest of the world is moving without a care or concern for German manufacturing or French farming – they are too busy with their own concerns.
Who can blame them?
Jonathan Ledwidge is the author of the book A Mannequin for President - www.amannequinforpresident.com
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